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We examine a model of network formation in single-layer and multiplex networks in which
individuals have positive incentives for social ties, closed triangles, and spillover edges. In
particular, we investigate the influence of shocks to the network in which the cost of social ties
changes after an initial equilibrium. We highlight the emergence of structural entrenchment: the
retention of structural features, such as closed triangles and spillover edges, which are formed under
historically different conditions from those currently driving network evolution. This work has
broad implications for understanding path dependence in the structure and dynamics of single-layer
and multiplex networks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The formation and persistence of social ties is dictated
by the incentives and opportunities to do so on the part of
the individuals involved. Those individual incentives can
shape the emergent structure of the networks that sub-
sequently form. For example, when social ties are pref-
erentially made with already well-connected individuals,
the resulting networks exhibit a scale-free structure that
is quite different from networks formed at random [1].
In the formation of social ties, many types of incentives
may operate simultaneously, based on the psychology and
economics of social connection, as well as the sociological
benefits of participating in a rich network. These in-
centives include the raw costs or benefits of maintaining
social relationships [2–5], the costs or benefits of closing
triangles [6, 7], and the costs or benefits of having what
have been called “spillover ties”—ties with the same in-
dividuals across multiple contexts, which, among other
things, can save on transaction costs and provide new
social affordances [8–12]. The kinds of network struc-
tures that result from such incentives acting in concert
are important to understand, but have not been exten-
sively studied, particularly for cases involving multiplex
networks.
Moreover, incentives for social ties may not be constant
over time. In some cases, the process of network forma-
tion is not path-dependent; ties formed between nodes
early on have little impact on later tie-formations. In
∗ paul.smaldino@gmail.com
such cases, the structure of the current network will re-
flect the present incentives that drive individual behavior.
On the other hand, consider scenarios in which incentives
at one time induce the formation of structural features.
These features may be maintained even when the origi-
nal incentives change, even if they could not have arisen
de novo under the second set of incentives. A concrete
example of this process involves incentives and costs as-
sociated with friendship formation at different stages in
life. Young adults may find it beneficial to form friend-
ship triangles (the friend of my friend is my friend), as
well as some more isolated friendships. When time con-
straints increase (due to work, marriage, children, etc.),
they will often need to restructure their friendships. In
such cases, maintaining existing triangular friendships
may be more economical than maintaining the isolated
friendships, and thus clustered friend groups will persist.
If, however, friendships are initially formed under high
time-constraints, there may not be sufficient time to fa-
cilitate friendship clusters. We refer to this type of phe-
nomenon as structural entrenchment: the persistence of
structural features formed under different conditions or
incentives than those currently prevailing, which would
not have formed had the current conditions always ex-
isted.
We investigate three questions in the present study:
1. How do social networks reorganize following
shocks, defined as drastic changes in tie-costs? In
particular,
2. What is the relationship between different tie-
formation incentives and network resilience
following shocks?
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23. To what extent do shocks in one layer of a multiplex
network affect the reorganization of another layer
of the multiplex?
To do so, we study a dynamic model of social network for-
mation on single-layer and multiplex networks with struc-
tural incentives that can vary over time. Accordingly, we
examine a two-layer multiplex network on which incen-
tives exist for social ties, closed triangles, and spillover
ties. We consider changes to incentives in the form of
system-wide shocks, such that all individuals in the net-
work experience drastic changes to the cost of forming
or maintaining social ties. Our model is not meant to
reproduce any particular social system, but rather to in-
tuit implications for a broad class of systems. Abstract
models, even unrealistic ones, have proven quite valuable
in forming intuitions of this sort [13–15].
A. Social Ties and Triangles
Social connections are incentivized in many ways. So-
cial connections provide psychological and health bene-
fits [3–5], and opportunities for cooperation [12, 16, 17],
learning [18–20], and economic activity [2, 21, 22]. Con-
sider, for example, social ties in the context of friend-
ship. One friend may provide companionship, infor-
mation about unfamiliar social conventions, and lodg-
ing when traveling far from home. Another friend may
help with technical projects and, through conversation,
the development of a stronger sense of empathy. Thus
we may simply say that social ties can carry benefits.
There are, however, limits to how those benefits can ac-
crue [23]. One cannot have 10,000 close friends (no mat-
ter what some avid social media fans claim), because of
the cognitive, temporal, and pragmatic costs associated
with maintaining all of those relationships. Furthermore,
the benefit to social relationships may have diminishing
marginal returns. If you have no friends, making one
is of tremendous importance. If you have 40 friends,
adding a 41st may carry few benefits unless your new
friend brings something quite unique to the table. In
our model, we will consider benefits to social ties with
diminishing marginal returns. Although many factors
influence the value of forming a social tie with one in-
dividual rather than another, for simplicity we assume
that, all else equal, the value of a social tie is insensitive
to the identities of the individuals involved.
It can also be of importance that one’s friends are
friends with each other. If your relationship with one
friend weakens, the other can help repair it. If three of
you work well together, new synergistic forms of coop-
eration can emerge that are impossible with only two.
The point is that there are important benefits to clos-
ing triangles—e.g., for your friends to be friends with
each other—beyond the first-order benefits to social ties
[6, 7]. In our models, we consider benefits to closed trian-
gles that exist independent of the direct benefits to social
ties.
B. Multiplexity and Spillover Ties
The majority of research on social networks has been
on single-layer networks, defined by a set of nodes and
a set of ties between them. Yet, the multi-relational
nature of human interaction has long been a consider-
ation [8, 9, 24, 25]. That is, for a given set of nodes
(representing individuals), there may exist multiple con-
texts for each of which a different set of ties describes
the structure of social relationships, and in which each
set of ties is known as a layer. Recently, a body of work
has arisen to study formal properties of multiplex net-
works, which both extends traditional network theory to
multiplex networks and also explores unique properties of
networks with more than one layer and interdependencies
between or among layers [26–36].
As an example of a multiplex, consider a set of individ-
uals for whom we can construct a neighborhood network
indicating residential contiguity among people. Two peo-
ple are connected if they live on the same block. Consider
also a friendship network in which people are connected
if they are friends. Finally, consider an organizational
network in which two people are connected if they par-
ticipate together in formal social settings such as work
or volunteer organizations. Individual behaviors on any
of these networks are not necessarily independent of the
other networks. You might become friends with your
neighbors or the people you work with, and in doing
so create opportunities that don’t exist for friends who
aren’t neighbors or neighbors who aren’t friends. Influ-
ence between layers of a multiplex network is sometimes
known as spillover [27]. In our model, we consider a
spillover effect in a two-layer network: nodes get a bonus
from forming a tie with a node in one layer if they already
have a tie with the same node in the other layer.
C. Changing Incentives
The costs for forming or maintaining ties may change
dramatically over time. The relative cost to forming
new social ties may be low for childless urban twenty-
somethings, but rather high when some of those individ-
uals grow older and acquire demanding jobs, romantic
partners, and children. However, although one may lose
some friends as one’s time becomes more constrained, one
rarely loses all of them. Social relationships formed when
younger and more carefree may become structurally en-
trenched by acquiring additional benefits, such as those
enjoyed by a tight-knit group of friends who look out for
one another’s interests, which can outweigh the increased
costs of maintaining relationships later in life when de-
mands on one’s time have increased [37, 38]. Although
changes to the incentives for forming and maintaining
social ties often occur gradually, they can also occur
3rapidly. For example, the birth of a child, the death
of a family member, or the loss of a job can very rapidly
alter the incentives for forming and maintaining social
relationships.
Similar dynamics are also possible when the nodes
of a network are institutional conglomerates, such as
tribes, corporations, or nation-states, rather than indi-
vidual people. For example, trade agreements between
corporations may form under supportive economic con-
ditions, such as those enjoyed among EU nations. Rela-
tions of this sort may become structurally entrenched, as
when multiple businesses share suppliers or distributors
and also trade with one another. Dramatic changes to
relational incentives, such as a sudden increase in tar-
iffs, may damage some existing relationships and hinder
new ones from forming, but leave intact those that are
structurally entrenched.
We model changes to the cost of social ties, leaving
constant the benefits of ties, triangles, and spillover ties.
We refer to these changes as shocks, because they are
sudden, system-wide changes to the system. We are in-
terested both in shocks that increase costs—which may
reduce the capacity of the network to maintain struc-
ture in the form of social ties—are well as in shocks that
decrease costs—which may increase the capacity of the
network to maintain such structure. We explore con-
ditions under which the network exhibits resilience and
maintains structure after a shock.
II. MODEL
Nodes represent individuals (or agents), and ties rep-
resent an ongoing social relationship between those in-
dividuals. For simplicity, all edges are assumed to be
undirected and unweighted. Our model is adapted from a
study by Burger and Buskens [39], who explored network
formation on a single-layer network in response to incen-
tives for ties and closed triangles. In their model, nodes
in an empty network could bilaterally add ties when such
an addition increased the utility of both parties, and drop
ties unilaterally if doing so would increase either node’s
utility. We extend this to a two-layer multiplex in which
there can be additional incentives for spillover ties. We
then examine network formation and explore the effects
of exogenous shocks, which occur after the network has
reached an equilibrium. A shock is operationalized here
as a system-wide change in the cost of social ties. Burger
and Buskens [39] restricted their analysis to small six-
node networks. Our analysis differs in that we consider
networks of arbitrary size. Our dynamics also differ from
theirs in that agents in our model are able to consider in
their decisions the total utility resulting from rewiring—
that is, simultaneously dropping one tie and adding a
different tie— whereas their model required all individ-
ual add or drop actions to be utility-increasing.
A. Utility
An agent’s utility results from three aspects of the so-
cial structure of an individuals’ local network. First, ties
have intrinsic benefits and costs. Each agent receives
a direct benefit for each tie it holds with another agent.
However, maintaining ties is also costly due to constraints
on time, attention, and transaction costs [39–41]. We as-
sume that benefits accrue linearly with the number of
ties, while the costs accrue at a faster rate. Our func-
tional form therefore represents diminishing marginal re-
turns to adding additional social ties. Other functional
forms that accomplish similar diminishing marginal re-
turns are of course possible.
Second, closing triangles may yield additional benefits.
We focus on scenarios in which local network closure is an
important form of social capital, such as through reduc-
ing the costs of information search and facilitating the
coordination on social norms [6, 7]. In other scenarios,
closed triangles may be undesirable, as utility is gained
through bridging structural holes [42]. Such scenarios
are also of interest, but for simplicity we do not consider
them in the present analysis.
Third, we consider the benefit of spillover ties across
layers of the multiplex. Specifically, we consider scenar-
ios in which having a tie with an individual in multiple
layers (or contexts) carries an additional benefit. For ex-
ample, being friends with your neighbor may carry bene-
fits beyond the sum of benefits from having a friend and
having a neighbor. We refer to the benefits and costs
of ties, triangles, and spillover in aggregate as the struc-
tural incentives of the network. The basic assumption is
that nodes act to maximize their marginal utility, that
is, they choose ties that maximize the net benefits from
their structural incentives.
Our analysis is restricted to a two-layer multiplex (Fig
1). We operationalize utility by extending the functional
form introduced in Ref. [39] to a two-layer multiplex and
including spillover benefits. The utility to agent i, with
ti` ties and zi` closed triangles in each layer ` and vi
spillover ties is given by the following function:
ui =
∑
`∈{1,2}
(
bti` − ct2i` + dzi`
)
+ evi, (1)
where b and c are the benefits and costs of maintaining
a tie in either layer, d is the benefit to a closed triangle
in either layer, and e is the benefit of spillover ties. The
benefits to social ties accrue linearly while the costs of
social ties accrue quadratically, which operationalizes the
idea that the marginal returns to additional social ties
will diminish, and eventually become negative, as ties
continue to be added (assuming c < b).
For simplicity, we mostly focus on cases in which the
structural incentives are the same in each layer, though
we do explore one case in which tie costs can vary be-
tween layers. Our model is therefore a special case of
a more complex model in which each layer has different
4FIG. 1. A schematic of the model system, here shown as a
four-node multiplex with two layers. The three leftmost nodes
are part of a closed triangle in Layer 1 (blue) but not in Layer
2 (red). The three bottommost nodes have spillover ties (ties
with the same nodes in both layers), depicted in bold.
structural incentives. Without loss of generality, we set
b = 1 for all simulations.
B. Network formation dynamics
Agents add new ties and drop existing ties in order
to increase their utility. Time is discrete and occurs in
rounds. Each round, each agent has the opportunity to
proactively add one new tie and delete one existing tie,
though neither action is obligatory. We say “proactively,”
because agents may also gain or lose ties through the ac-
tions of others. At the beginning of each round, each
agent, in random order, samples p other agents in the
network. For all our analyses, we use p = 10. We keep
this number constant across network sizes to reflect con-
straints on the cognitive and temporal limits to agent
observations.
On its move, an agent i considers all possible ties not
already held to each of the p sampled nodes in each layer
of the multiplex, and identifies the tie with node j in
layer ` whose addition would provide the largest increase
in utility, ∆u+ij`. If multiple ties have equally high value,
one is selected at random. If ∆u+ij` > 0, agent i proposes
the tie. If ∆u+ji` > 0, that is, if the addition of the tie
would also increase j’s utility, then the tie is formed,
otherwise it is not. Agents can only propose one new
tie each round, regardless of whether their proposal is
accepted1.
1 Our model assumes that nodes are not aware of the local net-
If the straightforward addition of any new tie will
not increase the agent’s utility, the agent then examines
whether it could increase its utility by rewiring, consid-
ering only those p nodes sampled. In other words, could
the agent increase its utility by dropping a currently held
tie with node h and replacing it with a tie with node j?
Here the agent considers all such pairings, and identifies
the pair (h, j) such that dropping its existing edge with
h and adding a new tie with j has the largest marginal
utility. If that marginal utility is larger than zero, the
agent proposes a tie with node j. If that tie is acceptable
to j (i.e., it increases j’s utility), the tie is made, and the
agent then drops its edge with node h. Otherwise, no
action is taken. The newly added tie need not be in the
same layer as the dropped tie, corresponding to agents’
ability to differentially allocate resources across contexts.
If no current tie has been dropped, the agent then con-
siders all its current ties, excluding any just added, and
identifies the tie for which dropping would lead to the
largest marginal utility gain. If that gain is larger than
zero, the agent drops the tie.
This process of network formation continues until a
stable network equilibrium has been reached. We opera-
tionally define an equilibrium after five complete rounds
in which no ties are added or dropped.
C. Noise
We focus our analysis on a version of the model in
which decisions are deterministic: agents attempt to add
only those ties that correspond to the largest gain in util-
ity. Proposed ties are accepted and existing ties dropped
only when they strictly increase an agent’s utility. How-
ever, we also examine the model’s robustness to stochas-
tic noise, governed by the parameter ν. When choosing a
new tie to propose, the agent chooses a node to connect
with in a utility-maximizing manner (as described above)
with probability 1− ν, and with probability ν the agent
selects an (unconnected) node and layer at random. Such
proposals are accepted without regard for utility with the
same probability. Similarly, an agent drops an existing tie
at random with probability ν. Unless otherwise stated,
simulations used ν = 0.
D. Shocks
Once the network reaches a state of equilibrium, a
shock occurs. A shock is an exogenous event that si-
multaneously changes tie costs for all agents. We restrict
our analysis to two costs, denoted clow and chigh. For all
works and corresponding utilities of other nodes. If they were,
they could selectively offer ties only to those nodes likely to ac-
cept them. This informational constraint is likely to apply for
some systems and not others.
5simulations, clow = 0.2, and, unless otherwise stated, we
use chigh = 0.6. After a shock, new structural changes
(i.e., adding new ties or dropping existing ties) may result
in a utility increase for some agents.
Our framework allows for two shock conditions to
be compared: low-high (LH) and high-low (HL). These
are contrasted with corresponding control conditions in
which no change in cost occurs: low-low (LL), and high-
high (HH). The first word (letter) denotes the pre-shock
tie cost, and the second word (letter) denotes the post-
shock tie cost. We examine two variations of shock-
related effects. In the first, we examine cases in which
changes in costs (i.e., shocks) occur in both layers of the
multiplex. In the second, shocks occur only in one layer.
This latter variation enables us to study how spillover
benefits can cause shocks to propagate across layers.
Our analysis focuses on the extent to which network
structure under the low-cost scenario is maintained after
a shock in which tie costs increase—we refer to this ex-
tent as the network’s resilience. This is most obviously
useful for studying LH shocks, but we find it can also be
informative about HL shocks, particularly under mixed
effects (in which both triangles and spillover ties are in-
centivized simultaneously). In the latter case, resilience
can be interpreted as the extent to which the network
structure under low tie costs can be fully realized when
the initial structure evolved under high costs. There are,
of course, many ways in which network structure can be
characterized. Due to its importance across many areas
of network science, its simplicity, and its common inter-
pretation as a measure of network density, we focus on
average degree. Resilience is operationalized thus:
δs =
ks − kHH
kLL − kHH , (2)
where ks is the average degree of the network at post-
shock equilibrium, and s ∈ {LH,HL} is the shock con-
dition. It is also possible to generalize this measure of re-
silience to any network-level metric by substituting that
metric for average degree, though as noted we have not
analyzed other measures of this type.
For most of our multiplex network analyses, the two
layers of the multiplex are statistically identical, so for
convenience we measure the average degree of Layer 1
only. In cases where the two layers are subjected to differ-
ent shocks, we compare the average degree of each layer
post-shock to Layer 1 of the pre-shock network; in this
case each layer will have a unique level of resilience.
E. Single-layer and Multiplex networks
We were specifically interested in network formation
and the effects of spillover in multiplex networks. How-
ever, our findings regarding the path dependency of net-
work formation on the timing of shocks has implications
on the type of single-layer networks that have more tra-
ditionally been studied in network science. Therefore,
we also present results on single-layer networks. In these
runs, all interactions are restricted to a single layer, and
the influence of spillover is undefined (and so e = 0).
Java code for our agent-based model is available at
http://www.openabm.org/model/5148/.
III. RESULTS
Here we describe the varieties of network organizations
that emerge under the incentives we describe above, un-
der low and high tie costs and after the shocks that take a
system at equilibrium from one tie cost to the other. Un-
der a wide range of conditions, much of the network struc-
ture facilitated under low costs can be preserved even af-
ter the costs significantly increase—structure that could
not arise de novo under high tie costs. As a quantitative
metric, we focus on the average degree. For most runs,
all incentives were identical for each layer of the multi-
plex, and so network statistics were effectively identical
for each layer. As such, we only present data for Layer
1 of the multiplex unless otherwise indicated. Our sim-
ulations cover networks of sizes ranging from 20 to 80
nodes; results are shown in main text are for a 40-node
network unless otherwise stated. In the SI Appendix we
show that our results are generally similar across these
different network sizes (see also Fig. A.1). All data is
from 100 simulation runs for each parameter condition
unless otherwise stated.
A. Isolated effects
We first examine single-layer networks (for which no
spillover is possible) in which there are additional bene-
fits to closed triangles. For our high cost scenario, we
purposefully chose an extreme case in which triangles
would not emerge due to the prohibitively high costs of
maintaining two-stars. However, our main result is ro-
bust, if less stark, for lower tie costs in which triangles
do emerge in the high-cost condition (see Figs. A.1B,D
and SI Appendix).
Under low costs, many triangles form, and the average
degree of the network increases as triangles are incen-
tivized more (Fig. A.1A). This is because closed trian-
gles scaffold the creation of addition triangles by provid-
ing affordances (e.g., new two-stars), forming a cascade.
Such a cascade does not go on indefinitely, as the costs
of ties can set a practical limit, especially when each new
edge must yield an increase in utility. The HL condition
closely tracks the LL condition, because both conditions
result from dynamics under low tie costs.
For values of d below a critical threshold, the LH con-
dition tracks the HH condition. That is, there is no re-
silience by structural entrenchment. This is because the
shock in which tie costs increase causes agents to drop
ties, and triangles cannot be maintained. Past the critical
threshold (d = 0.8 in our runs), some amount of resilience
6occurs. Some edges are dropped following the shock, but
the resulting network is denser than networks that began
with high tie costs. This first threshold occurs when the
benefit of a closed triangle can offset the higher tie cost,
so that a node in a closed triangle need not drop any ties.
Past a second threshold (d = 1.2 in our runs), when the
benefits to closed triangles are high enough, networks in
the LH condition are indistinguishable from networks in
the LL condition. See SI Appendix for a derivation of
these thresholds and for additional statistics regarding
the dynamics of single-layer networks.
For all subsequent results, we consider a two-layer mul-
tiplex. Like incentives for closed triangles in a single-layer
network, incentives for spillover ties can provide a mini-
mal model of structural entrenchment in a multiplex net-
work, as seen in the absence of triangle benefits (d = 0).
In general, we observe a similar pattern of resilience for
spillover as we did for triangles (Fig. A.1C). Unlike with
triangles, however, the average degree under low tie costs
does not continue to increase with the benefit to spillover
ties, but rather plateaus. This is because spillover ties
do not scaffold the creation of additional spillover ties,
as closing triangles does. Nevertheless, our results show
that a benefit for spillover ties can facilitate network re-
silience by structural entrenchment even in the absence
of benefits to clustering.
The network structures that emerge from spillover in-
centives are quite different from those that emerge from
triangle incentives (see SI Appendix). Under low tie
costs, incentives for triangles created several tightly clus-
tered but completely discrete communities. Incentives
for spillover, on the other hand, tended to create fully
connected graphs that exhibit low levels of triadic clo-
sure. Additionally, unlike the case of triangle benefits,
these networks are not fully resilient until a much higher
spillover benefit has been reached as compared with the
triangle case (e = 2 in our runs; see Fig. A.1C). This
is because each tie can only confer one unit of spillover
benefit, whereas a single tie can be part of many trian-
gles. See SI Appendix for derivation of critical thresholds
and for additional analyses on the isolated effects of both
triangle and spillover benefits.
B. Mixed effects
Our focus here is on cases where structural incentives
(for triangle closure and spillover) can combine to yield
a wide variety of networks. In Fig. 3 we plot representa-
tive networks that emerge when both closed triangles and
spillover ties are incentivized. The combined incentives
produce structures that are quite different from what we
see when each incentive is considered in isolation (see
Figs. S2 and S4 in the SI Appendix). In particular,
these combined incentives give rise to large, tightly clus-
tered communities connected via a single brokering node,
especially when both incentives are strong.
Although we study a two-layer multiplex, only one
layer is presented in these network diagrams. In all runs
presented so far, incentives in each layer are identical,
so statistically both layers are identical. However, this
does not capture the ways in which the two layers are
connected to each other. When spillover benefits are
strong relative to triangle benefits, most or all edges will
be spillover ties. Otherwise, about half of all ties are
spillover edges (see Fig. 5).
We can again quantify the emergent network structure
by using average degree and resilience. Fig. 4A shows the
average degree at equilibrium for cases in which no shock
occurred. Under high costs, average degree is largely un-
affected by structural incentives. Supporting the visual
inspection (see Fig. 3 ), we see that under low tie costs,
the effects are largely additive, yielding quite dense net-
works when strong incentives for both closed triangles
and spillover ties are present.
Fig. 4B shows the resilience for both shock conditions.
Our main result is captured by the LH condition (and
applies as well to the isolated effects cases): structural
incentives create resiliency in networks, and allow the re-
tention of structural complexity after an increase in tie
costs. This complexity could not possibly arise if costs
were very high to begin with. As Fig. A.1A documents,
with sufficiently high incentives for triangle closure, the
average degree of “shocked” (Low-High, and High-Low)
network matches closely those of the unshocked (Low-
Low) networks. We also find that as long as the triangle
benefit is high enough, additional spillover benefits do not
influence average degree, though they do influence other
aspects of network structure (Fig. 3). For low values
of d, stronger incentives for spillover ties can compen-
sate to create resiliency, and similarly for low values of
e and incentives for closed triangles. Indeed, the effects
of these incentives are additive in the model: resilience
under mixed effects occurs whenever the sum of d + e
exceeds a critical threshold (see SI Appendix for deriva-
tion).
For HL shocks, there is a regime under high structural
benefits in which resilience is actually lower than under
smaller benefits (Fig. 4B, bottom row). That is, when
tie costs are initially high, the presence of strong struc-
tural incentives prevents the network from becoming as
dense as it would have otherwise been once tie costs are
lowered, compared with the density of comparable net-
work in which initial tie costs are low. To explain this,
observe that, in the regime of e > 0.8, all ties will be
spillover ties (see Fig. 5). In the regime of d, e > 0.8, the
large structural incentives mean that any time an agent
has the opportunity to add a new tie that either closes a
triangle or completes a spillover at the expense of a cur-
rent tie that does not do those things, it will do so. This
also means that networks can become highly clustered
across both layers, including the formation of two-layer
triangles, even while tie costs are still high. An illustra-
tion of this is given in the SI Appendix (see Fig. S8).
This in turn means that, for a given node, the opportu-
nities for forming new ties when costs are lowered will
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FIG. 2. Isolated effects for (A, B) triangle benefits only (e = 0) and (C, D) spillover benefits only (d = 0). (A, C) Average
node degree ± SD for each of the four shock conditions on a 40-node network. (B, D) Average resilience for LH condition,
showing robustness across a range of network sizes.
be more constrained, and as such the emergent network
structures may have fewer overall connections than if the
network had been initialized with low tie costs. In con-
trast, when ties are consistently low, more two-stars will
form by chance before their triangles are closed, leading
to higher overall degree.
For most of the results presented thus far, data from
only one layer of the two-layer multiplex was presented.
This is justified because the initialization conditions and
structural incentives are identical for each layer, so they
will be statistically identical in structure. In terms of
the overall network structure, the additional features in-
volving spillover ties are not present. Fig. 5 shows the
proportion of all ties that are spillover ties as a function
of the structural incentives. This is calculated by dou-
bling the number of spillover ties and then dividing by
the sum of the total number of ties in each layer. We see
that, for low costs, most if not all edges will be spillover
ties whenever spillover benefit is strong relative to trian-
gle benefit. Otherwise, about half of all ties are spillover
edges. In the case of high tie costs, spillover ties were rel-
atively rare until e > 0.8, which is when the benefit of a
spillover tie became strictly larger than the utility a sin-
gle, non-spillover tie. Therefore, a node that could drop
its current tie in favor of a new one involving a spillover
edge was suddenly incentivized. See SI Appendix for fur-
ther discussion of spillover and network structure.
C. Mixed effects with shocks in only one layer
In all cases presented so far, we assumed that shocks
occurred in both layers of the multiplex. In some cases,
however, changes to structural incentives might occur in
only one layer. However, what happens in one social
context can influence social behaviors in other contexts
[26, 28]. To explore this idea with our model, we ran
simulations in which the shock occurred only in one layer
(always Layer 1). In other words, for LH (HL) shocks,
both layers began with low (high) tie costs. After an
initial equilibrium was reached, the cost of ties in Layer
1—but not Layer 2—increased (decreased).
For LH shocks—that is, in cases where tie costs
increased—results were largely unaffected by spillover
(Fig. 4C, top row). The un-shocked layer was not dif-
ferent in its average degree than either layer of the base-
line network that received no shock (Fig. 4A, top row).
Therefore the resilience of the un-shocked layer was uni-
formly high regardless of the type of incentives at work.
The shocked layer was similar to the baseline layer that
did receive a shock. (Fig. 4B, top row).
More interesting is the case of the HL shock, in which
tie costs decreased from high to low (Fig. 4C, bottom
row). For low values of e, the benefit to spillover, each
layer resembled the non-shocked network with the cor-
responding final cost. When e > 0.8, however, we did
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FIG. 3. Representative networks (Layer 1 only) under low costs (LL) that emerge as a result of varying incentives for closed
triangles and spillover ties. Unconnected nodes do occasionally occur but are not represented in these plots. These data are
based on networks of size N = 40; however, similar patterns emerge for networks of larger size (N = 60, 80).
observe a spillover effect in which the shocked layer grew
more similar to the unshocked layer and vice versa, rel-
ative to baseline. This is because under such structural
incentives and high tie costs, all ties are spillover ties
(Fig. 5). This means that all new edges formed initially
after the shock will exist in one layer only, creating more
opportunities to complete the spillover tie in the corre-
sponding layer. The addition of new non-spillover links
in the shocked layer after the shock creates incentives
for some agents to then add a corresponding tie in the
un-shocked layer, once the payoff for doing do outweighs
the cost of adding a new edge. In contrast, there will be
no spontaneous edge formation in the unshocked layer,
and so the amount of new ties in the shocked layer will
be diminished relative to the baseline case in which both
layers are shocked.
D. Lower costs
To maximize clarity and illustrate stark differences
between conditions, we purposefully chose a value for
high tie costs (chigh) that would minimize emergent net-
work structure. In this condition, triangles never form,
because forming a triangle requires closing a two-star,
the formation of which is never incentivized with such
high costs. Agents in our model are unable to sacrifice
short-term costs for long-term gain. Very short chains of
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FIG. 4. Mixed effects. (A) Average degree for the LL and HH (no-shock) conditions. (B) Resilience for HL and LH shock
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three nodes do sometimes form under large incentives for
spillover tie, because the cost of one additional tie can
be overcome by the added benefit of the spillover tie it
forms. This condition permits a clear contrast with our
low-cost scenario, which does permit the formation of tri-
angles and long chains. As such, we can show exactly the
extent to which structural incentives provide resilience to
the network once tie costs become high after a shock.
That being said, it is important to illustrate that our
main effect is robust to cases where some complex net-
work structures emerge even under high costs. To test
this, we repeated our mixed effects simulations (in which
shocks affected both layers of the multiplex), but with
chigh = 0.3. In this case, triangles and chains formed
even under high costs, though the average degree of the
network was still lower than under low costs (still set at
clow = 0.2). These results are described in the SI Ap-
pendix (see Fig. S11). We find that, although the zone
of intermediate resiliency (in which δs is less than one
but greater than zero) is much smaller than it is when
chigh = 0.6, there are still clear zones of zero resilience
when d and e are small and total resilience when they are
large.
E. Noise
Our main results concerning resilience are entirely a
consequence of the stable nature of structural features
like triangles and spillover edges. Our model assumes
that individuals will always act to maximize their utility
and will never take an action that decreases their utility.
The path-dependent nature of structural features induces
(sometimes high) levels of resilience in networks undergo-
ing shocks. Under conditions of deterministic rationality
and path-dependence, many social ties can remain in-
centivized even when tie costs increase. However, if one
starts with an empty network, it is very much a case of
“you can’t get there from here,” to borrow a favorite New
England colloquialism.
This matters, because if noise or poor decision making
were to destroy those incentivized structural features of
the network, it is doubtful that they could be recovered.
Under high tie costs, when noise leads to the suboptimal
adding or dropping of ties, it is only the HH equilibria
that are truly stable. The equilibria that result from LH
shocks, which we have shown to demonstrate resilience,
are only metastable. An important question then be-
comes: how susceptible to noise are those LH equilibria
(really pseudoequilibria under noise). This can be posed
by asking how quickly following a shock, in which tie
costs increase, does a network initialized with low costs
revert to the state of network initialized with high costs.
We find that, for a noise rate ν, the number of rounds
required for this to occur was approximately 1/ν (see SI
Appendix and Fig. S8). This is reassuring. If decisions
are often made randomly or deviate significantly from
optimality, path dependence will not matter a great deal
to network formation. However, as long as levels of noise
are reasonably low, path-dependency appears to have a
substantial effect on network resilience. Specifically, with
low levels of noise, it takes a network a long time to lose
its pre-shock structural features.
IV. DISCUSSION
We see that quite interesting and varied networks can
form under combined incentives for social ties, triangles,
and spillover ties. More importantly, we have shown that
when there exist sufficiently high incentives for closed tri-
angles, spillover, or both, networks can be quite resilient
to shocks due to structural entrenchment.
Our results indicate how network structures can
emerge and respond differently to local incentives for the
formation and dissolution of social ties at different points
in the network formation process. Moreover, the exis-
tence of spillover effects between layers of multiplex net-
works shows that historical events in one layer can change
the structure of other layers. Our investigation therefore
has broad implications for understanding the formation
and evolution of complex social networks in many real
world contexts. In particular, it highlights processes that
induce dramatic changes in individual incentives, as well
as processes that involve spillover between different social
contexts.
Further extensions of our model may be useful for un-
derstanding a wider range of behaviors on multiplex net-
works in relation to shocks and resilience. For example,
the addition of node-level heterogeneity would allow for
the inclusion of homophilic or parochial behavior. Het-
erogeneity could also be applied to incentives, allowing
different subsets of the population or different social con-
text (corresponding to different layers of the multiplex)
to vary in systematic and realistic ways. We assumed in
the present analysis that all nodes in a layer experienced
shocks at the same time. Exploring the implications of
shocks affecting only a subset of nodes will be impor-
tant for understanding how local events can propagate
influence throughout a multiplex. In addition, we have
only analyzed relatively small networks of 80 nodes or
less. Although our analysis indicates that our results
are likely to hold for networks within an order of mag-
nitude or more in size, exploration of the dynamics of
substantially larger networks may be useful to test of the
boundaries of our findings.
Most real world systems are quite a bit more com-
plex than the system expressed in our model. However,
understanding the nature of resilience through structural
entrenchment, as well as the influence of spillover in mul-
tiplex networks, may help guide both the analysis and
collection of social network data in a wide variety of do-
mains, from international relations to internet applica-
tions to the study of social ties across range of human
cultures. Moreover, one can always add more complex-
ity to a model in the name of increased realism. How-
11
ever, simple models such as ours, which are easier to un-
derstand and analyze, can nevertheless yield important
insights of their own, and also provide a baseline from
which to perform richer explorations [13]. In this case,
such parsimony allowed for the discovery and exploration
of a novel network phenomenon.
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SI APPENDIX
(Online Supplement)
Appendix A: Exploration of Isolated Effects
1. Isolated effects: Triangle benefits only
We first examine single-layer networks (for which no
spillover is possible) in which there are additional bene-
fits to closed triangles. Network statistics are presented
in Fig. A.1. Under low costs, many triangles form,
and the average degree of the network increases as trian-
gles are incentivized more (Fig. A.1A). This is because
closed triangles scaffold the creation of addition triangles
by providing affordances (e.g., new two-stars), forming
a cascade. Such a cascade does not go on indefinitely,
however. The costs of ties can set a practical limit, espe-
cially when each new edge must yield an increase in util-
ity. The HL condition closely tracks the LL condition,
because both conditions result from dynamics under low
tie costs.
For values of d below a critical threshold, the LH con-
dition tracks the HH condition. This is because the shock
in which tie costs increase causes agents to drop ties, and
triangles cannot be maintained. Past the critical thresh-
old (d = 0.8 in our runs), some amount of resilience oc-
curs. Some nodes are dropped, but the network is denser
than networks that began with high tie costs. This first
threshold is when the benefit of a closed triangle can
offset the higher tie cost, so that a node in a closed tri-
angle need not drop any ties. Past a second threshold
(d = 1.2 in our runs), when the benefits to closed tri-
angles are high enough, networks in the LH condition
are indistinguishable from networks in the LL condition.
See below for a derivation of these thresholds. Exam-
ining the average clustering of the network mirrors this
finding (Fig. A.1B). When triangles are incentivized and
tie costs permit their closure, clustering maximizes fairly
rapidly. Fig. A.2 illustrates the types of network struc-
tures that emerge under each shock condition and varying
benefits to closed triangles. Examining the average node
utility at equilibrium, we also observe that resilience al-
lows post-shock LH nodes to maintain higher utility even
after costs increase than they would if costs had always
been high.
2. Isolated effects: Spillover benefits only
We next consider a two-layer multiplex (and will do so
for all subsequently presented results). Like incentives
for closed triangles in a single-layer network, incentives
for spillover ties provide a minimal model of structural
entrenchment in a multiplex network. In general, we see
a similar pattern of resilience for spillover as we did for
triangles (Fig. A.3). Unlike with triangles, however, the
average degree under low tie costs does not continue to
increase with the benefit to spillover ties (Fig. A.3A).
Rather, it plateaus. This is because spillover ties do not
scaffold the creation of additional spillover ties, as clos-
ing triangles does. In other words, the existence of a
spillover tie does not provide new opportunities for ad-
ditional spillover ties. The critical threshold for some
resilience in the LH condition is the same for spillover as
for triangles, which is unsurprising when the benefit of
a spillover tie can prevent a node from needing to drop
a tie due to increased costs. Unlike with triangles, the
network is not fully resilient until a much higher spillover
benefit has been reached as compared with the triangle
case (e = 2 in our runs). This is because each tie can only
confer one unit of spillover benefit, whereas a single tie
can be part of many triangles. See below for derivation
of critical thresholds.
Past the first critical threshold, the average degree of
the HL condition is slightly lower than for the LL condi-
tion. This is because all ties will be spillover ties under
high costs and large e. This ends up making it more dif-
ficult for some nodes to find partners who would accept
their offer to form a tie. The reason is that fewer would-
be partners stand to increase their utility from adding a
tie. Interestingly, the average utility received by a node
at equilibrium in the LH condition is not any higher than
that of a node in the HH condition. That is, nodes who
end up in a high-cost environment experience no benefits
nor costs, in the short run, on the basis of whether tie
costs were initially high or low. This contrasts the case
where we examine variations in triangle benefits. The
difference is due to the fact that the benefit of additional
spillover ties is compensated by the higher costs of more
ties.
The network structures that emerge from spillover in-
centives are quite different from those that emerge from
triangle incentives (Fig. A.4). Under low tie costs, in-
centives for triangles created several tightly clustered but
completely discrete communities. Incentives for spillover,
on the other hand, tends to create fully connected graphs
that exhibit low levels of triadic closure (Fig. A.3B). This
structure is not fully recovered in the LH shock condition.
Rather, an intermediate structure emerges composed of
several isolated chains or circles.
Appendix B: Explanation of Transition Points
1. When resilience begins.
Here we derive conditions for when, on average, kLH >
kHH . We consider only the isolated effects conditions for
clarity. In addition, we focus on a minimal type of re-
silience observed in our simulations: when two or more
edges are not possible under high tie costs but are present
following a shock to high costs from initially low tie costs.
Different types of resilience for different degree thresholds
are also possible, as shown in later sections of this Ap-
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FIG. A.1. Isolated effects: triangle benefits only (e = 0). (A–C) Average results for each of four shock conditions on a 40-node
network. (A) Average node degree ± SD, (B) Average node clustering ± SD, (C) Average node utility at equilibrium ± SE,
(D) Average resilience for LH condition, showing insensitivity to network size.
pendix.
First, let us condition only triangle benefits (e = 0)
under a single-layer network. Figure B.5 indicates the
threshold parameter values for additional ties. We see
that under low tie costs, there is always the incentive to
have at least two social ties, while under high costs, only
one tie is incentivized. Under low tie costs, the utility for
two and three ties is identical, and so adding a third tie
only occurs if d > 0, which is what we observed (main
text, Fig. 2). When tie costs increase from low to high,
we see that the triangle benefits must be quite high to
maintain three ties, unless the individual node already
has three triangles. Thus, there is often a reduction from
four or three ties to two. However, two ties can be stable
as long as d ≥ 0.8 and the agent is in a closed trian-
gle, because only when it is below this threshold is there
a strict increase in agent utility from dropping an edge.
More generally, this minimal level of resilience between
two and one network ties will be seen when the following
two conditions are met: (1) a second edge will never be
added de novo under high tie costs but will always be
favored under low tie costs, and (2) the benefit to trian-
gles ensures that, if a closed triangle exists, dropping an
edge, and hence losing the triangle, will not be favored
under either ties cost level.
Condition 1 is met when
1− clow < 2− 4clow,
or when clow < 1/3, and, correspondingly, chigh ≥ 1/3.
Condition 2 is met when
d ≥ 3chigh − 1.
Under the value we used, chigh, the threshold value of d is
0.8, which is exactly what we observed in our simulations.
The logic of this analysis is easily extended to the case
of spillover benefits only (d = 0, e > 0), although there
are are a greater number of relevant ego networks, mak-
ing the transition diagram quite complicated. See Figure
B.6. The presence of a spillover benefit for either of a
node’s ties allows a second tie to be maintained after a
shock from low to high tie costs. This logic also explains
the diagonal threshold line seen in Figure 4B (main text)
in the LH shock condition. The resiliency effects of tri-
angle and spillover benefits are additive, such that if an
agent possesses both a spillover edge and a closed trian-
gle, it is resilient to shocks as long as the total d + e is
greater than the threshold, which in this case is 0.8.
2. When resilience is perfect.
When does kLH = kLL? In our simulations, we observe
that, when triangle or spillover benefits are sufficiently
large, resilience is perfect, and the average degree of the
network does not diminish when a network formed under
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FIG. A.2. Isolated effects: triangle benefits only (e = 0). Representative single-layer networks that emerge as a result of
varying incentives for closed triangles, d. Unconnected nodes do occasionally occur but are not represented in these plots.
low tie costs experiences a sudden increase to tie costs.
What this means is that the incentives are such that a
stable state reached under low tie costs will not become
unstable when tie costs are suddenly made high.
This is most easily illustrated by considering the case
of spillover benefits only (d = 0; see Figure B.6). Un-
der low tie costs, nodes will often reach degree 4 (Note
that this is the average degree for Layer 1 only. When
the layers have the same incentives, network statistics are
the same for both layers.). However, such a high degree
is unstable unless all edges are spillover edges. And be-
cause it is not always possible to increase the degree of
a node and increase the number of spillover edges simul-
taneously, degree 3 (and even degree 2) is the common
and stable network state for low tie costs (see main text
Figures 4 and 5). Although degree 3 is stable under low
tie costs, it is unstable after post-shock high tie costs
unless e ≥ 2.0, which is the threshold point for perfect
resilience. If e is less than this, a node’s degree will de-
crease to k = 2 if e ≥ 0.8 (partial resilience), and k = 1
otherwise (no resilience). This argument can be extended
for all shock-related network dynamics for any incentive
parameter values.
3. When complete spillover occurs in HH
condition.
Under constant high tie costs (HH condition), there is
a threshold value of the spillover benefit, e, above which
all ties are spillover ties (see Figure 8 in the main text).
For our simulations, this value is e > 0.8. Such a state
occurs when the cost of adding a new tie that completes a
spillover edge is favored, but subsequently dropping any
non-spillover ties is also favored. This is illustrated in
Figure B.7.
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FIG. A.3. Isolated effects: spillover benefits only (d = 0). (A–C) Average results for each of four shock conditions on a
40-node network. (A) Average node degree pm SD, (B) Average node clustering ± SD, (C) Average node utility at equilibrium
± SE, (D) Average resilience for LH condition, showing insensitivity to network size. All but (C) are from Layer 1 only.
Appendix C: Probability of spillover pairs from
random pairing
Earlier in this Appendix, we calculated the threshold
transition parameter for when all ties will be spillover
ties. Before that, our simulations indicate that a smaller
number ties are spillover ties, except with e = 0, for
which spillover ties are rare. In such a case, spillover
ties are rare due to the fact that they will only occur
by chance, and the number occurring may be less than
expected in a purely random model due to high numbers
of isolated clusters that form when only triangle benefits
are present. In other cases, spillover ties follow a pattern
in which they are weakly incentivized, and therefore the
proportion corresponds to numbers higher than should
be expected by chance. What is this number?
We can calculate this for the special case in which each
node has degree of 1, which occurs under high tie costs.
Under random pairing, each node chooses the name node
as its neighbor in each layer with probability 1/(N − 1),
and this is equal to the expected proportion of edges
that will co-occur in both layers, i.e., the proportion of
spillover edges. For a 40-node network, as was used in
most simulations presented in the main text, this approx-
imately equal to 0.026.
Appendix D: Explanation of Fig. 4B in the main
text
Figure 4B, bottom row, in the main text shows a
curious result: the resilience of under HL shocks is
lower when structural benefits are significantly high—
specifically when d, e > 0.8. To explain this we note that
under such high structural incentives, many nodes will
form triangles even under high tie costs. Thus, when tie
costs are lowered, there are fewer new connections that
will be incentivized. Figure D.8 provides an illustration
of how this can occur.
Appendix E: Supplemental Simulation Results
1. Sensitivity to noise
When network dynamics exhibit resilience, post-shock
equilibria are metastable in LH conditions, befitting the
path-dependent nature of the equilibria (i.e., the net-
work states cannot be obtained from an empty network).
As such, random events—adding or dropping edges at
random—will eventually eliminate resilience, causing the
system to settle into a state resembling those obtained
under high initial tie costs. The key word here is eventu-
ally. To investigate the time scale of these dynamics, we
16Isolated effects: Spillover (d = 0)
LL
LH
HL
HH
e =  0 e =  0.2 e =  1.0 e =  1.6
LL, d = 0, e = 0
LH, d = 0, e = 0
HL, d = 0, e = 0
HH, d = 0, e = 0
LH, d = 0, e = 0.2 LH, d = 0, e = 1.0 LH, d = 0, e = 1.6
HH, d = 0, e = 0.2 LL, d = 0, e = 1.0 LL, d = 0, e = 1.6
HL, d = 0, e = 0.2 HL, d = 0, e = 1.0 HL, d = 0, e = 1.6
HH, d = 0, e = 0.2 HH, d = 0, e = 1.0 HH, d = 0, e = 1.6
FIG. A.4. Isolated effects: spillover benefits only (d = 0). Representative networks (Layer 1 only) that emerge as a result of
varying incentives for spillover ties, e. Unconnected nodes do occasionally occur but are not represented in these plots.
ran simulations in which adds and drops occurred with
probability ν (see details in main text). We found that
after shocks from low to high tie costs, the system moved
from the metastable (LH) higher-degree state to the sta-
ble (HH) low-degree state at a timescale that was approx-
imately t ∼ 1/ν. This was confirmed for ν ∈ [10−4, 10−1].
Our results therefore hold as long as most events are
strictly utility-increasing, relative to the characteristic
timescale of dynamics.
2. Sensitivity to population size
Our results were very robust to changes in population
size. This is largely because the numerical values of indi-
vidual incentives operated on the tie capacity of nodes,
independent of the size of the network. Larger network
created few shortages for social ties, and the so the aver-
age degree of agents tended to be slightly higher in larger
networks than in smaller networks, but this affect was
minimal (Figure E.10). Average clustering was similarly
robust (Figure E.11). For triangle benefits only, clus-
tering was slightly higher in very small networks, due
to more triangles forming through random chance as a
result of the small population. The same was true for
the spillover benefits only case. In this case, incentives
tended to push the network away from clustering. When
network size was very small, some additional clustering
happened as a result of change connections. This effect
disappeared for larger networks.
3. Sensitivity to tie costs
The results shown in the main text used parame-
ters chosen for maximal clarity. For example, when tie
costs were always high (HH condition), the equilibrium
degree was exactly one. However, the broader prin-
ciple of our results—namely, resilience from structural
entrenchment—should hold for a wide range of parame-
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FIG. B.5. Individual utilities for triangle benefits only (e = 0), for different number of ties and triangles (∆), and utility-
increasing state transitions under LH shock conditions. Precise values are given for low tie costs, clow, and high tie costs,
chigh, in blue and red, respectively. Blue arrows indicate when adding (or dropping) an edge would result in a utility increase
under low tie costs. Red arrows indicate where dropping an edge would be incentivized under a post-shock tie-cost increase.
Solid lines indicate a move that is always favored (sometimes only when d > 0), dashed lines indicate moves dependent on the
triangle benefit, d. For the transition between 3 and 4 ties, only a subset of transition lines are shown for clarity. The remaining
transitions can be easily calculated with the values shown.
ters. To demonstrate this, we rand simulations for which
the “high” cost of social ties was sufficiently low to gen-
erate higher degree networks, and thus the possibility of
triangles. Figure E.12 illustrates that, although the re-
silience effects are less stark, there are similar patterns
of resilience as seen with more extreme tie cost values.
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FIG. B.6. All 34 possible ego networks (centered on the grey node) and corresponding utilities for spillover benefits only
(d = 0). Ties in layer 1 are indicated by solid blue lines, ties in layer 2 are indicated by dashed red lines. Utility values are
given for low tie costs (uL) and high tie costs (uH), based on the values for clow and chigh used in the main text. A transition
diagram for these networks under each cost and shock condition (LH, HL), similar to that shown in Figure B.5, can be derived
from these states and corresponding utilities, though it will be considerably more complicated.
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FIG. B.7. The dynamics of spillover under high tie costs. Consider an agent A who has a tie with agent C in layer 1 and
a tie with agent B in layer 2 (top row).The agent can add a tie in one of the two layers to complete a spillover edge; in this
case with agent B in layer 1 (middle row). Such a move is favored if the utility gained from the new spillover tie is great
enough to compensate the added costs of the second tie in layer 1; in our case, this occurs when e > 0.8. Once this new tie
is formed, it is then always beneficial to agent A to drop its previously held tie with agent C in layer 1 (bottom row). Thus,
under high tie costs, we observe a threshold value of e above which the average degree does not change (it remains k = 1),
but for which the proportion of spillover edges increases to unity. Below this threshold, there are still more spillover ties than
expected from random assortment, due to limited incentives to form spillover ties. Utilities calculated assume our simulation
value of chigh = 0.6.
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FIG. D.8. (A) Eight distinct ego networks (for the grey node) under high tie costs (chigh = 0.6), with utilities indicated. Edges
can exist both in layer 1 (blue) and layer 2 (red) of the multiplex. (B) Transitions between the states indicated in subfigure
A. Black arrows indicate transitions that are always favored. Blue arrows indicate transitions that are sometimes favored; the
required condition for each transition is shown in blue text. The grey dashed arrow between state 6 and state 7 indicates that
the presence of state 6 centered on an adjacent node is required for ego to transition from state 3 to state 7. The red dashed
line indicates that this transition is never favored under the indicated cost condition.
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FIG. E.9. Sensitivity to noise. Temporal dynamics of representative simulation runs. Under initially low tie costs, average
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FIG. E.10. Sensitivity to network size: average degree.
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FIG. E.11. Sensitivity to network size: average clustering.
22
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
triangle_payoff_1_mean
sp
illo
ve
r_
pa
yo
ff_
m
ea
n
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
AvgDegree_1_mean
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
triangle_payoff_1_mean
sp
illo
ve
r_
pa
yo
ff_
m
ea
n
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
AvgDegree_1_mean
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
triangle_payoff_1_mean
sp
illo
ve
r_
pa
yo
ff_
m
ea
n
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
degpropHL
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
triangle_payoff_1_mean
sp
illo
ve
r_
pa
yo
ff_
m
ea
n
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.9
degpropLH
LL
triangle benefit, d
sp
illo
ve
r b
en
efi
t, 
e
HH
triangle benefit, d
sp
illo
ve
r b
en
efi
t, 
e
hki
hki
A
triangle benefit, d
sp
illo
ve
r b
en
efi
t, 
e
sp
illo
ve
r b
en
efi
t, 
e
triangle benefit, d
LH
HL
h si
h si
B
Lower costs: clow = 0.3 
FIG. E.12. Average degree for all four shock conditions when chigh = 0.3 and clow = 0.2.
